- Strategic Studies and International Relations (SSIR) Program,
School of History, Politics and Strategy (PPSPS), FSSK
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)
43600 Bangi, Malaysia
- Cheng-Chwee KUIK is an associate professor at the Strategic Studies and International Relations Program at the Nation... moreCheng-Chwee KUIK is an associate professor at the Strategic Studies and International Relations Program at the National University of Malaysia (UKM), and concurrently an associate fellow at the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya (UM). He is the co-founder and co-convener of the East Asian International Relations (EAIR) Caucus, a research platform for exchange, engagement, and empowerment among foreign affairs professionals in Malaysia. Dr. Kuik is an adjunct lecturer at the Malaysian Armed Forces Defense College (under Ministry of Defense) and the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Previously he was a postdoctoral research associate at the Princeton-Harvard “China and the World” Program (CWP) and a visiting research fellow at Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations. Dr. Kuik’s research concentrates on weaker states’ foreign policy behavior, state alignment choices, regional multilateralism, East Asian security, China-ASEAN relations, and Malaysia’s external policy. His publications have appeared in peer-reviewed journals as well as edited books. Cheng-Chwee’s essay “The Essence of Hedging” was awarded the biennial 2009 Michael Leifer Memorial Prize by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for the best article published in any of the three ISEAS journals. He is a co-editor (with Alice Ba and Sueo Sudo) of Institutionalizing East Asia (Routledge 2016). His current projects include: hedging in international relations, ASEAN states’ responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (with Lee Jones), and the politics of China-related railroad projects in Southeast Asia (with David Lampton and Selina Ho). Cheng-Chwee serves on the editorial boards/ committee of Contemporary Southeast Asia, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asian Perspective, and Routledge’s “IR Theory and Practice in Asia” Book Series. He holds an M.Litt. from the University of St. Andrews, and a PhD from the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be contacted at cckuik@gmail.comedit
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China's South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic... more
China's South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic imperatives. Structurally, the perceived opportunity after the global fi nancial crisis and later, the perceived risk of a US-led encirclement after Obama's " rebalancing to Asia " strategy have both pushed China to take a more hard-line approach to maritime disputes. However, the necessity to avert regional backlash has, on the other hand, compelled Beijing to counteract its maritime moves with active economic and diplomatic statecraft to reassure its smaller neighbours, albeit with mixed effects. Domestically, the contradiction is rooted in the ruling Communist Party of China elites' needs to strike a balance between their different pathways of legitimation: while nationalist legitimation necessitates China to assert its sovereign rights, performance legitimation requires it to pursue a cooperative regional strategy via the " Belt and Road Initiative " so as to preserve a stable and productive environment needed for sustained domestic growth.
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If " militarisation " is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation moves, however,... more
If " militarisation " is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation moves, however, have received the most attention and criticism from most quarters. This should not be surprising. Although China’s military actions are relatively recent and less entrenched as compared to US longstanding robust military presence in Asian waters, the rising power’s militarisation activities in the contested areas over the past years have been pursued at the largest scope (compared to other regional countries), at the fastest rate, and with potentially most consequential implications for the extant regional order. China's militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing's growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its " militarisation " activities.
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The extant literature on alignment behavior have focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations, and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have... more
The extant literature on alignment behavior have focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations, and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have examined the micro aspects of alignment choices. This article attempts to fill in the gap by unpacking the constituent component of weaker states’ alignment decisions, with a focus on ASEAN states’ hedging behavior in the face of a rising China in the post-Cold War era. It contends that the enduring uncertainty at the systemic level has compelled the states to hedge by pursuing contradictory, mutually counteracting transactions of “returns-maximizing” and “risk-contingency” options, which seek to offset the potential drawbacks of one another, as a way to project a non-taking-sides stance while keeping their own fallback position at a time when the prospect of power structure is far from clear.
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This article analyzes Malaysia’s alignment behavior vis-a-vis America and China, with a focus on explaining how the weaker state’s insistence on hedging has both motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary... more
This article analyzes Malaysia’s alignment behavior vis-a-vis America and China, with a focus on explaining how the weaker state’s insistence on hedging has both
motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that regional states choose to align militarily with the rebalancing America to hedge against China, the article argues that this characterization is only partially true; a more accurate account is that weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations. In the case of Malaysia, while Putrajaya aims to mitigate the challenges of an assertive Beijing, its alignment
behavior is more a function of a desire to offset several systemic and domestic risks, namely, the shadow of entrapment, abandonment, and alienation, alongside the fear of authority erosion at home.
motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that regional states choose to align militarily with the rebalancing America to hedge against China, the article argues that this characterization is only partially true; a more accurate account is that weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations. In the case of Malaysia, while Putrajaya aims to mitigate the challenges of an assertive Beijing, its alignment
behavior is more a function of a desire to offset several systemic and domestic risks, namely, the shadow of entrapment, abandonment, and alienation, alongside the fear of authority erosion at home.
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A version of this op-ed appears in print on December 7, 2015, in The International New York Times.
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This article explains Malaysia’s US policy under Prime Minister Najib. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia’s policy, its substance has been shaped by structural and domestic considerations. Structurally, in... more
This article explains Malaysia’s US policy under Prime Minister Najib. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia’s policy, its substance has been shaped by structural and domestic considerations. Structurally, in the face of a fast rising China, Malaysia is compelled to keep a more balanced relationship with all the major powers. This structural push, reinforced by Obama’s “pivot,” has been nonetheless limited by a concern about the risks of entrapment, abandonment, and antagonism. Domestically, there are economic and political
motivations to develop closer ties with Washington. These, however, have been counteracted by a calculation of not wanting to align too closely with America. These structural and domestic determinants together explain the smaller state’s strategy towards the superpower at a time of systemic change.
motivations to develop closer ties with Washington. These, however, have been counteracted by a calculation of not wanting to align too closely with America. These structural and domestic determinants together explain the smaller state’s strategy towards the superpower at a time of systemic change.
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This article argues that the U.S.–Southeast Asia relations under Obama have been driven and limited by a “partially converged hedging” process between the two sides. On the one hand, the United States has sought to push back and hedge... more
This article argues that the U.S.–Southeast Asia relations under Obama have been driven and limited by a “partially converged hedging” process between the two sides. On the one hand, the United States has sought to push back and hedge against the longer-term risks of a rising challenger by mobilizing its alignment and diplomatic assets in Asia. The structural imperative, however, has been conditioned by a calculation of not wanting to be rigidly locked in any regional problems. On the other hand, the ASEAN states have correspondingly hedged against the uncertainty surrounding China’s rise by leveraging on the United States’ enhanced engagement. This driver, nonetheless, has also been conditioned by a fundamental concern of not wanting to confront the rising power in an outright manner. Unless China’s actions have posed an immediate threat that leaves the states no choice but balancing, such a partially converged hedging process is likely to endure in the years to come.
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Recent International Relations scholarships and policy publications have used the term “hedging” as an alternative to “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in describing small states’ strategies towards a rising power. In the case of Southeast... more
Recent International Relations scholarships and policy publications have used the term “hedging” as an alternative to “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in describing small states’ strategies towards a rising power. In the case of Southeast Asian countries’ responses to a reemerging China, more and more analysts have asserted that none of the smaller states are pursuing balancing or bandwagoning in the strict sense of the terms, and that the states are in fact adopting a “middle” position that is best described as “hedging”. This paper seeks to assess this assertion by performing three principal tasks. First, it attempts to identify the key defining attributes and functions of hedging as a strategy that is distinguishable from pure forms of balancing and bandwagoning. Second, it aims to operationalize the term within the context of Southeast Asia-China relations, by focusing on the cases of Malaysia and Singapore’s response to China in the post-Cold War era. Third and finally, the study explains why these two states have chosen to hedge in the way they do. The central argument of the essay is that the substance of the two smaller states’ policies are not determined by their concerns over the growth of China’s relative power per se; rather, it is a function of regime legitimation through which the ruling elite seek to capitalize on the dynamics of the rising power for the ultimate goal of justifying their own political authority at home.
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This article aims to study the origins and patterns of China’s involvement in regional multilateral institutions, as well as its characteristics and implications for China’s ASEAN policy in the post-Cold War era. To this end, the study... more
This article aims to study the origins and patterns of China’s
involvement in regional multilateral institutions, as well as its
characteristics and implications for China’s ASEAN policy in the post-Cold War era. To this end, the study focuses on China’s participation in three ASEAN-initiated and -driven multilateral institutions, namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN-China cooperation, and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process. The article shows that China’s perceptions and policies toward multilateral institutions have been going through significant changes, from caution and suspicion to optimism and enthusiasm. Instead of perceiving multilateral institutions as malign arrangements that might be used by other states to challenge China’s national sovereignty and to limit its strategic choices, Beijing now views multilateral institutions as useful diplomatic platforms that can be utilized to advance its own foreign policy objectives. Such perceptual changes have slowly but significantly led to a greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy in China’s ASEAN policy. It can be argued that multilateralism now plays a complementary, rather than a supplementary role to bilateralism in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy towards ASEAN in the new era.
involvement in regional multilateral institutions, as well as its
characteristics and implications for China’s ASEAN policy in the post-Cold War era. To this end, the study focuses on China’s participation in three ASEAN-initiated and -driven multilateral institutions, namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN-China cooperation, and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process. The article shows that China’s perceptions and policies toward multilateral institutions have been going through significant changes, from caution and suspicion to optimism and enthusiasm. Instead of perceiving multilateral institutions as malign arrangements that might be used by other states to challenge China’s national sovereignty and to limit its strategic choices, Beijing now views multilateral institutions as useful diplomatic platforms that can be utilized to advance its own foreign policy objectives. Such perceptual changes have slowly but significantly led to a greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy in China’s ASEAN policy. It can be argued that multilateralism now plays a complementary, rather than a supplementary role to bilateralism in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy towards ASEAN in the new era.
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本文旨在分析影响中国参与东盟主导的地区机制( 东盟地区论坛、/ 10+ 10以及/ 10+ 30) 的因素。作者认为中国参与上述机制与三大利益考虑有关: 政治与安全利益( 维持稳定的周边环境、促进多极化、消除/ 中国威胁论0、扩大影响力、避免台湾地区与东盟国家建立实质关系) 、经济利益( 实施/ 走出去0战略、推动地区经济一体化) 以及形象利益 ( 建立负责任大国形象) 。本文的中心思想是: 中国对地区性国际机制日益积极的参与, 除了是基于对政治、经济与安全利益的考虑外,... more
本文旨在分析影响中国参与东盟主导的地区机制( 东盟地区论坛、/ 10+
10以及/ 10+ 30) 的因素。作者认为中国参与上述机制与三大利益考虑有关: 政治与安全利益( 维持稳定的周边环境、促进多极化、消除/ 中国威胁论0、扩大影响力、避免台湾地区与东盟国家建立实质关系) 、经济利益( 实施/ 走出去0战略、推动地区经济一体化) 以及形象利益
( 建立负责任大国形象) 。本文的中心思想是: 中国对地区性国际机制日益积极的参与, 除了是基于对政治、经济与安全利益的考虑外, 身份认同的转变也是一个重要因素。
10以及/ 10+ 30) 的因素。作者认为中国参与上述机制与三大利益考虑有关: 政治与安全利益( 维持稳定的周边环境、促进多极化、消除/ 中国威胁论0、扩大影响力、避免台湾地区与东盟国家建立实质关系) 、经济利益( 实施/ 走出去0战略、推动地区经济一体化) 以及形象利益
( 建立负责任大国形象) 。本文的中心思想是: 中国对地区性国际机制日益积极的参与, 除了是基于对政治、经济与安全利益的考虑外, 身份认同的转变也是一个重要因素。